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1. Introduction 
The principles of how the social costs of increasing public expenditures should be calculated, is 
probably one of the most explored fields in public economics. Dreze and Stern (1987) and Auerbach 
and Hines (2002) provide comprehensive overviews. The social cost of a project in which resources 
are used to provide a public good can be decomposed into two multiplicative components: 1) The 
direct resource cost and 2) the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). The direct resource cost is the 
shadow price of the resources used in the project. In distorted economies the shadow price of each 
specific resource is not uniform, but differs between sources of use. The correct shadow price of each 
one of the resources is a weighted average of the source specific shadow prices, where the relevant 
weights are the reduction of the resource in each source of use. The MCF measures the social unit cost 
associated with financing the public expenditure by increasing distortionary taxes.1 A unique number 
representing the MCF for the tax system as a whole, exists only in the theoretical second-best 
situation, where all tax instruments are chosen optimally. In general, one specific MCF-estimate can 
be associated with each tax instrument.   
 
In principle, empirical assessments of both the direct resource cost and MCF require information far 
beyond what is and will be available. The crowding out effects caused by the project and the 
additional reallocations caused by the tax financing, should be calculated within general equilibrium 
models. Although Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling of the distortive effects of 
taxation has reached an advanced level, there are well known problems of this approach. Credible and 
robust estimates of key parameters determining consumer and producer behaviour are often lacking. 
Despite improved access to an increasing amount of data, it is still hard to give a relevant description 
of important distortions. Non-tariff import barriers represent a good example. Several details in the 
direct and indirect tax system are lost in CGE models because only a few representative consumers are 
specified, facing some kind of average marginal tax rates, not the actual ones. If peaks and holes in the 
tax- and tariff systems are camouflaged in widely defined average tax- and tariff rates, the 
classification and the level of aggregation of goods and industries also affect the potential for welfare 
gains; a highly aggregated model may lose possibilities for reallocation with high potential impact on 
aggregate efficiency. In addition, aggregation and simplifications usually imply less operational 
models. However, although any empirical assessment may be criticised, cost-benefit analyses should 
                                                     
1 A vast literature discusses conceptual and other theoretical issues related to estimates of MCF(s). Examples of surveys 
include Haakonsen (1998), Auerbach and Hines (2002), Sandmo (1998) and Snow and Warren (1996). There are also several 
CGE-based assessments to choose from, including e.g. Jorgenson (1996), Madsen (2004). Vennemo (1991), Holmøy and 
Strøm (1997) and Håkonsen and Mathiesen (1997) assess MCF for the Norwegian economy. 
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play an important role in policy making, and there are no better alternatives than using CGE models to 
make systematic use of available relevant information in order to get the estimates of social costs as 
accurate as possible.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to present and interpret a CGE-assessment of the social cost of a marginal 
project undertaken by the government. Our primary concern is the estimate of the direct resource cost, 
but our estimate of the total social cost of the project also include MCF associated with a broad tax on 
labour income, such as the pay roll tax. The reason for focusing on the estimate of the resource cost is 
that CGE-estimates on this cost component are rare in the CGE literature compared to the number of 
MCF estimates. One explanation may be that resource cost estimates are typically needed in cost 
benefit analyses of rather small well defined projects, which are unlikely to affect relative prices.  
 
However, the subsequent analysis will reveal that estimates of the direct resource cost will benefit 
from using the information that can be extracted from a CGE-model, even if the project is marginal. 
The point of using a CGE model is not only to take into account that the project may affect market 
prices. A more general point is that taxes and market imperfections distort market prices from the 
corresponding shadow prices. As mentioned above, the shadow price of a resource is not observable, 
and depends in a possibly complex way on the crowding out effects generated by the project. A 
properly designed CGE model serves as a way of storing relevant information of price distortions, and 
it is an indispensable tool for making the best possible estimates of the crowding out effects induced 
by the project. Norway represents an economy with relatively generous welfare state schemes. Despite 
the government petroleum revenues the tax rates are among the highest in the OECD area. This makes 
it especially interesting to use Norway as an illustration of the empirical importance of using CGE 
estimates of the social cost of a government project rather than its observable market price. Probably, 
our results have general relevance for welfare states with relatively high effective taxes. 
 
We consider a marginal project, which is "representative" in the sense that the relative composition of 
labour and other inputs equals the composition for the total government consumption in Norway. We 
base our estimates on a rather disaggregated intertemporal CGE-model of the Norwegian economy, 
which has been developed to give a detailed picture of the distortions of the relative prices caused by 
e.g. taxes, subsidies, various types of industry assistance, monopolistic competition in the home 
markets, tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Thus, we are able to capture a large number of intra- and 
intertemporal reallocations potentially important for aggregate efficiency. The richness of the model 
structure also enables us to take into account several endogenous public budget effects in addition to 
changes in tax bases due to reallocations.  
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The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we use a highly stylised model to explain what turns 
out to be the most important driving forces behind the results derived from the simulations on the 
MSG6 model. Section 3 provides a brief description of the most relevant aspects of our CGE model. 
Section 4 describes the policy experiment and we present and interpret our estimates. In Section 5 we 
summarise our results, we compare them with other relevant estimates, and we suggest some 
directions for future research that may improve our estimates. 
2. Social costs in a stylised model of the model 
The subsequent formal model analysis highlights how the effective taxation of labour income implies 
that the social cost of increasing public sector employment is reduced from the ex ante market price, 
the more the project crowds out leisure, rather than consumption. The model is hardly interesting for 
its own sake. The motivation of the analysis is to focus on what turns out to be the most important 
determinants of the results of the MSG6 simulations. 
 
Consider a closed economy in which a representative price taking consumer allocates his exogenous 
time endowment (T) to leisure (F) and market labour (L). The utility function ( )U U F C= ,  is 
homothetic and scaled so that the marginal utility of money is equal to unity in the initial equilibrium. 
C is consumption. The labour supply is allocated to the private sector (LP) and the public sector (LO). 
The private sector is competitive and produces X units of a single numeraire good. The private sector 
has the production function X LPs= , where 0 1< ≤s  is the scale elasticity. We disregard public 
consumption of the private good, so that X = C in equilibrium. Public expenditure affects neither the 
utility of private consumption and leisure, nor the production function. It is therefore neglected in the 
analysis, since we are interested in the cost of public expenditure. The consumer receives wages and 
profits from the private sector. Constant tax rates, tL, tC and tπ are levied on labour income, 
consumption and profits, respectively . The consumer budget constraint is 
,RTwFwC
LL
C ++=+ ππτττ
τ where τ C Ct= +1  is the consumer price, ( )P w t wF L L= − ≡1 τ  is the 
price of leisure. w is the pre tax wage rate, and ππτ t−=1 . R is a possible lump-sum transfer, 
perceived as exogenous by the consumer. We define ( ) ( )τ τ τ'≡ + − = ≥1 1 1t tC L C L  as the effective 
tax wedge between the social and private terms of trade between leisure and consumption. The first 
order condition for utility maximisation becomes 
 
(1) ′
′
=
U
U w
C
F
τ ' . 
6 
Profit maximisation implies  
 
(2) sL wP
s−
=
1 . 
 
Saving means waste in a static model like this, and is ruled out. The public budget constraint implies 
that the public budget surplus, B, is rebated to the consumer 
 
(3) ( ) 01 =−−−++= RwLtwLttCtB OLPLC ππ , 
 
Although B = 0, it turns out to be useful to keep it as a variable. Equilibirum in the product and labour 
market then implies 
 
(4) B C LPs+ =  
 
(5) L L T FP O+ = − . 
 
Eqs. (1) - (5) determine the endogenous variables C, F, LP, B og w, as well as one of the tax 
instruments tC, tL, tπ, or R. Implementing the public sector project implies a the exogenous change dLO 
combined with the endogenous adjustment in one of the four tax instruments necessary to keep B = 0. 
 
Solving the model yields the following implicit equilibrium solution for F 
 
(6) 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
′ − − −
′ − − −
=
− −
−
U F T L F B
U F T L F B s T L F
C O
s
F O
s
O
s
,
,
'τ
1 . 
 
We write the corresponding explicit equilibrium solution for F as  
 
(7) ( )F f L t t BO C L= , , , . 
 
The general equilibrium relationship ( )f L t t BO C L, , ,  should not be confused with the demand function 
for leisure. Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (7) yields the equilibrium solution for C.2 Inserting this and Eq. (7) 
                                                     
2 The formal equilibrium relationship becomes ( )[ ], , , ssP O O C LC L T L f L t t B= = − − . 
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into the utility function, yields the equilibrium relationship between private utility and the policy 
variables 
 
(8) ( )U g L t t BO C L= , , , . 
 
Neither R nor tπ enters Eqs. (6) and (9) because the profit tax works as a lump sum tax. A partial 
increase in R (or tπ) must be accompanied by a budget neutral adjustment of tπ (or R), as long as B is 
constant. The net lump-sum transfer is then unchanged, and there are no real effects. The partial 
derivatives ∂ ∂f LO and ∂ ∂g LO  measure the equilibrium changes in, respectively, leisure and utility 
by an increase in public employment, contingent on lump-sum financing. The partial derivatives 
∂ ∂f B and ∂ ∂g B  should be interpreted as the equilibrium effects on F and U of increased public 
consumption of the private good through waste or saving without purpose. The partial derivatives 
∂ ∂f ti and ∂ ∂g ti , i = C, L measures the equilibrium effects on F and U of differential taxation used to 
finance a lump-sum transfer.   
 
Substituting the equilibrium solutions into Eq. (3) yields ( ) 0,,,, == RtttLhB LCO π , from which we 
calculate the adjustment of tax rate i necessary to finance the project dLO: 
 
(9) dt
dL
h L
h t
i
O B
O
i
=
= − >
0
0∂ ∂∂ ∂ .  
 
By substituting the implicit solution for the endogenous tax from ( )h L t t t RO C L, , , ,π = 0  into Eqs. (7) 
og (8), we obtain the solutions for F and U¸ satisfying the public budget constraint. The social cost of 
the budget neutral policy {dLO, dti } can be decomposed as  
 
(10) dU
dL
g
L
g
t
h L
h tO i O i
O
i
= + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ .  
 
We define dg LO∂  as the direct social resource cost or the shadow price of public employment. We 
define the second term in Eq. (10) as the social cost of financing increased public employment by 
adjusting tax rate i. Following the definition of MCF in Sandmo (1998), the social cost can be written 
 
(11) i
OiO
MCF
L
g
dL
dU
∂
∂
= . 
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The multiplier MCFi reflects the welfare loss of raising public funds by increasing the tax instrument i. 
This definition of MCFi is also used in Ballard and Fullerton (1992).3 According to this definition, 
MCF = 1 in the case of lump-sum financing. If the initial equilibrium is second best, MCFi = MCF > 
1. It follows that if the initial equilibrium is not second best, financing through a proportional increase 
in all distortive tax rates implies that MCF is higher than in the second best case. But there may exist 
some taxes for which MCFi < 1 when no restrictions are imposed on possible initial distortions. 
 
Figure 1 og 2, taken from Ballard and Fullerton (1992), illustrate equilibrium allocations and welfare 
effects caused by increased public employment in the stylised model. In Figure 1 the convex curve 
starting in T on the horizontal time axis, shows the ex ante production frontier. The curves denoted UA, 
UB and UC are indifference curves of the utility function. A is the first best equilibrium. The production 
frontier through B shows the production and consumption possibilities ex post the increase in public 
employment. B is the ex post equilibrium when lump-sum financing is possible. The loss of utility then 
equals the market price of the project when there are no distortions ex ante. In the case of distortive 
financing the slope of the private budget constraint becomes flatter. C exemplifies the equilibrium in 
this case. The utility loss of moving from B to C measures the cost of public funds when there are no 
initial distortions. By our definition, MCF is the difference in utility levels obtained in A and C 
relatively to the difference in utility levels obtained in A and B.  
 
Figure 1.  Equilibrium effects of increased public employment when the ex ante equilibrium is 
first-best 
T-L 0 
A 
C 
U B 
U A 
C 
F
T
B 
U C 
  
 
                                                     
3 Alternative definitions of MCF exists in the literature. For the sake of comparison with the MCF estimates for the 
Norwegian economy given in Vennemo (1991), note that Vennemo defines MCFi as O idU wdL . This definition includes 
the effect of the deviation between the shadow price and the market price in MCF. 
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Figure 2.  Equilibrium effects of increased public employment when the ex ante equilibrium is 
distorted 
C 
C 
F
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F 
E 
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U D 
T-L 0   
 
Figure 2 illustrates the more realistic situation where the ex ante equilibrium is distorted. The Figure 
has now been simplified by assuming constant returns to scale. C is the ex ante equilibrium, and D is 
the ex post equilibrium with lump-sum taxation. The social cost of the policy is measured by the 
vertical distance DE. The interesting lesson to learn from Figure 2 is that the social cost is lower than 
the market price (the distance DF) because of the ex ante distortions. 
Determinants of the cost components 
Eq. (10) provides a conceptual definition of the two components of the total social costs of the project. 
In order to understand the nature of the determinants of the magnitude of these components, we 
differentiate the utility function and undertake the substitutions that reveal how the utility effect 
depends on reallocations and initial distortions:  
 
(12) dU U dC U
U
dFC F
C
= ′ +
′
′
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =τ τC Ow dF dL
1 1
'
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ = −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢⎢
⎤
⎦⎥⎥
P dF
dL
P dL
dL
dLF
O
F
P
O
Oτ ' ,    
 
when dB =  0, and utility is transformed by setting the initial marginal utility of income equal to unity. 
Eq. (12) shows that the social cost equals the market price of the project, wdLO , when the initial 
equilibrium is first-best, i.e. τL = τC = 1. Except from this reference case, τ' > 1. The last pair of 
brackets in Eq. (12) illustrates the Ramsey-Boiteux rule; the social cost is a weighted average of the 
shadow prices of the resources crowded out by the project. In this stylised model, the expansion of 
public employment crowds out leisure and private consumption through reduced private sector 
employment. Crowding out of leisure is equivalent to stimulating labour supply. The shadow price of 
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private consumption exceeds the shadow price of leisure by a factor equal to the effective tax rate τ'. 
Therefore, the ratio of the social cost to the market price is lower the more leisure is crowded out 
instead of consumption. The equilibrium change in leisure to the policy {dLO, dti } can be shown to be 
 
(13) dF
dL
L
L
L
Fb
O i
O
i
P
i
=
−
+ −
µ
µ
1
1
,  
 
where i = π, C, L indicates the tax instrument used to finance the project. µi measures the additional 
substitution effect on leisure when tax instrument i = L, C is used to finance the project instead of 
lump-sum or profit taxation. µL = (σ/b)(LO/L) and µC = (σ/b)(PFLO/τC C), where σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between leisure and consumption. b = s + (1 - s)σ captures the feed-back effects on time 
allocation from the fact that variations in private employment brings about changes in relative prices, 
and thereby substitution effects. b is increasing (decreasing) in s when σ < (>) 1. We will confine the 
discussion below to the case where σ < 1, since this is the case in MSG6. Moreover, we consider 
financing by tL only, as the simulated cost estimates are approximately the same when tC is used as the 
tax instrument. As will be explained in the Section 3, decreasing returns to scale is an important aspect 
of the MSG6 model. However, in order to understand the significance of decreasing returns to scale 
for the equilibrium changes in the time allocation and utility, it is instructive to first interpret effects in 
the simpler constant returns case. When s = 1, and Eq. (13) simplifies to 
 
(13') 
L
L
F
LdL
dF
OPLO σ
σ
−+
−
=
1
1 , 
 
which is more negative the more σ  is reduced from the standard reference case of Cobb Douglas 
preferences, i.e. σ = 1. Thus, when σ < 1, the substitution effect in favour of leisure induced by higher 
taxation of labour income, is not strong enough to dominate the income effect caused by use of labour 
in the project. In the limit case σ = 0, the adjustments keep the ratio F/(T-LO) unchanged. Eq. (13') 
shows that the decrease of leisure, or the increase in total employment, is dampened the broader is the 
ex ante base of the tax rate that is raised, i.e. the greater is LP/F.  
 
Except from the special case σ = 1, the decrease in leisure is dampened as s decreases from unity. In 
MSG6, b < 1 since s < 1 and σ < 1. Compared to the case of constant returns to scale, there is less 
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crowding out of leisure, which amplifies the social cost of the project. The intuition is that the income 
effect on leisure is reduced, whereas the substitution effect is strengthened. 
3. The CGE-model 
General features 
MSG6 provides a rather detailed description of Norwegian commodities and industries. The model 
specifies 32 private business industries, 7 government sectors and 60 commodities. The classification 
is intended to obtain homogeneity within aggregates with respect to the actual design of trade- and 
industry policies, as well as to production and demand functions. The Norwegian National Accounts 
(NA) constitutes the main empirical data source for both calibration and estimation of behavioural and 
technology parameters. The results presented in the next sections were obtained on a model version 
calibrated to 1995-data. This means that tax rates and other initial distortions are as they were in this 
year.4  
 
The Norwegian economy is assumed to be too small to affect world prices. The exchange rate is 
normalised to unity. All agents have access to international markets for financial capital, where they 
face an exogenous real rate of interest. An intertemporal budget constraint applies to the economy as a 
whole, reflecting the budget constraints for the household and the government. As the accumulated 
foreign debt depends on what happens in this transition period, the steady state solution of the model is 
path dependent.5 Government consumption and transfers are exogenous in real terms. The public 
budget constraint is satisfied by endogenous adjustments of tax rates. Goods and services, including 
those from labour and capital, are perfectly mobile across industries. Supply equals demand in all 
markets in all periods. Thus, we rule out the possibility that the public project is a free lunch absorbing 
involuntarily unemployed resources only. 
Household Behaviour 
Consumption, labour supply and savings are derived from the decisions of a representative price 
taking household with perfect foresight. The household maximises an intertemporal CES welfare 
function of the utility obtained in each year over an infinite horizon, subject to an intertemporal budget 
                                                     
4 Several indirect taxes and subsidies include a Pigou-element. The corresponding externalities are, however, not described in 
the model. Accordingly, the distortions relatively to the social optimum are not accurately captured by the taxes, subsidies 
and other price distortions as measured in the model. A correction for this shortcoming is demanding but should be on the 
agenda for future research. 
5 See e.g. Turnovsky (1995), Ch. 12 for a formal analysis of path dependency of the steady state solution in intertemporale 
models of open economies. 
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constraint and a time constraint effective in each period. The period utility is a CES function of leisure 
and a nested CES aggregate of private consumption of goods and services. We use the welfare 
function of the household to measure the welfare effects of the use of resource and changes in tax rates 
implied by the project. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 0.3. The rate of 
subjective time preference is fixed equal to the exogenous after-tax interest rate to obtain a steady state 
solution.  
 
In each period the consumer allocates an exogenous time endowment to leisure and labour according 
to standard consumer theory. The real wage rate facing the consumer is reduced by several taxes, 
including the average marginal tax rate on market labour income, VAT and other indirect taxes and 
tariffs on private consumption. In addition, the household effectively carries the burden of the pay-roll 
tax and other taxes on production. Based on microeconometric studies of labour supply in Norway, see 
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption 
has been set to 0.6 in order to be consistent with an uncompensated wage elasticity of aggregate labour 
supply equal to 0.1.6 The compensated wage elasticity of labour supply is 0.5. This parameterisation is 
of course uncertain. However, we consider it to be consistent with the assessments most Norwegian 
economists do when they are "forced" to make up their opinion on aggregate labour supply 
elasticities.7 The composition of private consumption is determined in a nested separable structure of 
origo adjusted CES subutility functions, see Aasness and Holtsmark (1995).  
Market Structure and Producer Behaviour 
Output and input in an industry can change both because of changes at the firm level and as a result of 
entry or exit of firms. Firms differ in exogenous productivity in most industries, which implies an 
endogenous distribution of the size of the profitable firms, see Holmøy and Hægeland (1997). Firms 
are run by managers with perfect foresight, who maximise present after tax value of the cash flow to 
owners. The private profitability is affected by the system of capital income taxation, the payroll tax, 
taxes on other input factors, and various commercial policy instruments. Firms are price takers on all 
factor markets and combine inputs according to a system of nested constant-returns-to-scale CES 
functions. Most of the elasticities of substitution have been set in accordance with estimates presented 
in Alfsen, Bye and Holmøy (1996). The production function at the firm level exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale. The scale elasticities range from 0.85 - 1.00.8 The general pattern of decreasing 
                                                     
6 Existence of non-labour income is the reason why the direct uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is positive, 
despite the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption being less than unity. 
7 Bye and Holmøy (1997) provides a more detailed description of the intertemporal behaviour and the labour supply decision 
in MSG6. 
8 Evidence of decreasing returns to scale at the firm level is presented in Klette (1994). Compared to Klette's estimates, the 
scale elasticities in MSG6 are negatively biased. This bias was accepted in order to avoid unrealistic specialisation patterns 
within the export oriented industries. 
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returns to scale creates pure profits, and it makes the traded goods sector more diversified than in the 
case of constant returns. Decreasing returns also implies (external) adjustment costs of investment.  
 
Producers of manufactures and tradable services allocate their output between the domestic and the 
foreign market. It is assumed costly to change the composition of output between exports and 
domestic deliveries. Firms are price takers in the export markets and in the domestic markets of 
primary products (such as agricultural products, fish), which are relatively homogeneous. Firms 
engage in monopolistic competition in the domestic markets of manufactures and services since 
Norwegian customers are assumed to consider products within these categories as close, but imperfect, 
substitutes. Drawing on Klette (1994), the mark-up factors are set to 2-5 percent over marginal costs. 
The elasticities of substitution between the differentiated products within the composite industry 
goods, are large in order to be consistent with these low mark-up factors. This implies that the scope 
for love-of-variety effects on aggregate welfare is relatively small. 
Imports 
Within the categories manufactures and services, imported products are considered as close but 
imperfect substitutes for the corresponding differentiated products supplied domestically. Thus, import 
shares of these tradables depend negatively on the ratio of the exogenous import price to the price 
index of domestic deliveries. Elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported products are 
based on Naug (1994). Goods produced by primary industries are assumed to be regarded as 
homogenous by both Norwegian and foreign consumers. The domestic prices of these commodities 
are equal to the corresponding exogenous import prices, and the model determines net imports, as the 
residual between domestic production and domestic demand. 
4. CGE estimates of resource costs and cost of public funds 
Defining the project  
The hypothetical project requires the same input in each year over an infinite horizon. Confining the 
analysis to the cost side, we disregard any benefits from the project such as productivity gains in the 
private sector or direct welfare effects for the households working through the utility functions. The 
project is marginal; the real value of the inputs equals 100 millions NOK measured in 1995-prices, i.e. 
0.01 percent of GDP in 1995. It employs 335 persons. The composition of inputs is equal to the 
average composition of the total government consumption in 1995. The direct cost share of wages was 
61 percent in 1995, whereas the cost shares of materials and capital were 33 and 6 percent 
respectively. The project does not need any fixed capital. In addition to the resource use, the project 
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involves an endogenous adjustment of a specified set of tax rates, in order to keep the annual public 
budget surplus unchanged compared to a reference path, in which the project is not implemented.9  
The resource cost  
We estimate the direct social resource cost by simulating the welfare effect of the project when it is 
financed by lump-sum taxation. This corresponds to estimating OLg ∂∂  in the exposition in Section 2. 
We measure the welfare effect by the change in the household's intertemporal welfare, computed as an 
annuity. The direct resource cost is estimated to 73 percent of the ex ante market price of the 
resources, see Table 1.  
Table 1: Resource costs and MCF. Constant annuities in percent of the ex ante market price 
 Lump sum Pay roll tax 
A. Social cost (= B + C) 73.2 88.0 
B. Resource cost10 73.2 73.2 
C. Additional excess burden     0 14.8 
D. MCF (= A/B = 1 + C/B)     1 1.20 
 
The most important reason to the large difference between the resource cost and the ex ante market 
price of the project was explained in Section 2: The high effective tax rate on labour income in 
Norway makes the social resource cost a decreasing function of the share of leisure in the resources 
absorbed by the project. A substantial share of the employment needed in the project is the result of 
crowding out of leisure, not only of private consumption; total employment increases by 303 persons, 
whereas the project employs 335 persons. The reduction of leisure contributes to reduce welfare by 
about 30 percent of the ex ante market price of the project, corresponding to 41 percent of the welfare 
loss. In the case of lump-sum taxation, the increase in labour supply is foremost due to the income 
effect of the project, as relative prices remain almost unchanged; the household provides resources for 
the project by a close to proportional reduction of private consumption and leisure. 
 
The most important elements in the effective tax rate on labour income (in 1995) include: i) an 
average marginal tax on personal labour income approximately equal to 40 percent; ii) an effective 
payroll tax rate, including a compulsory social security premium, on labour costs averaging 17 
percent; iii) a net indirect tax rate on consumption averaging 19 percent. The tax wedge made up by 
                                                     
9 In the "project path" all exogenous variables have the same values as in the reference path, except the ones affected by the 
project. Effects of the project are measured by the deviation between the project path and the reference path. 
10 The estimated resource cost includes endogenous changes in government real consumption caused by changes in market 
sales of government output. See Holmøy and Strøm (1997) for an explanation of this effect, which is relatively small.  
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these three tax rates makes the ratio between the social and the private marginal rate of transformation 
of leisure into consumption equal to 1.19*1.17/ (1 - 0.40) = 2.32.11  
 
The changes in relative prices are bounded to be negligible since we consider a marginal project. 
However, small changes in relative prices, and thereby also in marginal utilities, should be regarded as 
a more general result, which make our estimate of unit costs relevant for large projects. The 
insensitivity of relative prices to the changes in demand caused by the project reflects that the textbook 
model of a small open economy (SOE) provides quite a good approximation of how relative prices are 
determined in the MSG6 model. In the SOE-model the assumption of constant returns to scale in all 
industries, implies that relative prices are completely determined by exogenous productivity conditions 
in the traded goods sector, independent of the demand side and production levels in the various 
industries. The same forces are the dominating basic determinants of the real wage rate in the MSG6 
model.  
 
However, since MSG6 captures decreasing returns to scale in private industries there is some scope for 
changes in relative prices. The project generates a slight increase in the real wage rate, reflecting a 
small increase in marginal labour productivity as the traded goods sector is scaled down. However, 
scale elasticities in the interval 0.85 - 0.95 make the price elasticity of export supplies relatively large. 
Consequently, the necessary increase in the producer real wage rate will be small. The rise in the real 
wage rate is consistent with the intertemporal constraint on foreign debt, because the project reduces 
the average import share of domestic demand. This is due to a smaller import share in government 
consumption than in private consumption. This effect dominates the positive effect on imports caused 
by the expansion of aggregate demand.   
 
Table 2 shows the main macroeconomic reallocations caused by the project when it is financed by 
lump-sum taxes. Intertemporal substitution to price dynamics implies that the crowding out of private 
utility increases somewhat over time. The price dynamics is triggered by the reduced investment 
demand for home goods. Due to the assumption that no investment is required in the government 
project, the long run result is a reduction in the aggregate capital stock, most notably household 
capital12. The drop in aggregate investments is strongest over the first years, whereas the long run 
reduction equals the reduction in the replacement investment. This implies, cet. par., lower production 
and lower marginal costs in the domestic industries producing capital goods. Through mark-up pricing 
                                                     
11 Another important distortion is early retirement schemes, which implies a large subsidy of leisure. Holmøy (2002) and 
Holtsmark (2002) assess the effective tax wedge related to early retirement under the present conditions in Norway. 
However, our estimates do not include labour supply effects of changes in retirement behaviour. 
12 The most important items in the Household capital are Dwellings and cars. 
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of domestic deliveries this cost reduction is spread to the prices of domestically produced goods.13 The 
short run reduction in aggregate saving is much smaller than the reduction in fixed capital 
investments; financial investment abroad is increased through an increase in the net exports in the first 
years following the project implementation. The sharp short run import reduction is due to both the 
decline in the aggregate import share, as well as the drop in investment demand. These effects 
dominate the effect of the deterioration of international competitiveness caused by the increase in the 
real wage rate. 
 
Table 2:  Short and long run reallocations in the case of lump-sum taxation. All figures, but 
Employment, are computed as deviations in fixed prices from the reference path in 
percent of the ex ante market price (= 100 mill NOK) 
 Instantaneous Stationary 
Utility -67.8  -75.8  
   Leisure     -29.5  -30.5  
   Private (material) consumption -38.3  -45.3  
Government consumption 101.5  100.8  
Gross real investment -25.6  -4.3  
Export -7.2  -9.0  
Import -9.5  -3.1  
Current account surplus, current prices 18.8  0.0  
Total saving, current prices -5.6  0.0  
GDP 43.6  45.7  
Real capital -24.8  -135.0  
Employment, persons 295  301  
 
The public budget effect 
In order to estimate the social cost of the public funds associated with the project, the necessary funds, 
or the public budget effect, must be computed. This corresponds to estimating OLh ∂∂  in Section 2. 
Whereas model simulations show that the welfare effects from reallocations other than increased 
employment are numerically insignificant, they play a more significant role in the determination of the 
equilibrium effect on the public budget. Pure theoretical reasoning leaves us with the rather useless 
qualitative conclusion that the ex ante market price of the project may be a poor estimate of the 
equilibrium public budget effect. Our simulations suggest that the budget effect is indeed significantly 
lower than the ex ante market price, see Table 3. In particular, this is true for the long run stationary 
                                                     
13 In addition the dynamic changes in investments imply that the increase in labour demand is lower in the short run than in 
the long run. However, this effect is hardly visible when the project is as small as assumed in this paper. 
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budget effect, which is only 80 percent of the ex ante market price. Measured in terms of constant 
annuities the budget effect equals about 85 percent of the ex ante market price.  
 
Table 3:  Changes in government income and expenditure caused by the project. Percent of the 
ex ante market price 
 Instantaneous Stationary  
A. Direct tax revenue and social security premiums 17.4  24.8  
B. Indirect tax revenue, subsidies etc. -10.1  -2.3  
C. Government consumption  101.1  102.5  
= Loss of net revenue (= C – B – A) 93.8  80.0  
 
The primary reason why the budget effect is lower than the ex ante market price is that the increase in 
employment raise the bases for direct labour income taxes and the payroll tax. This effect dominates 
the revenue loss resulting from the crowding out of private consumption. The computations take into 
account that the effective resource prices paid by the government are net of taxes, and that most 
government transfers are indexed to wages or prices. The increase in the direct tax revenue and the 
decrease in the indirect tax revenue over time are due to the dynamic price and wage effects explained 
above. The reason why the change in government consumption deviates from 100 is primarily that the 
reduction in private consumption reduces the market sales of services produced by government 
sectors.14 
The cost of public funds 
When the project is financed by the payroll tax rather than a lump-sum tax, Table 1 shows that the 
total social cost of the project increases by 14.8 percent of the ex ante market price. This implies a 
MCF-factor associated with payroll taxation equal to 1.20. Table 4 shows the main reallocations 
generated by the project when, respectively, the payroll tax and the VAT is adjust to neutralise the 
public budget effect.  
 
The figures confirm the reasoning in Section 2: A higher payroll tax implies a reduction of the 
consumer real wage rate, which reduces labour supply. Compared to lump-sum tax financing, the 
project now crowds out more private consumption and less leisure. Thus, the composition of resources 
crowded out by the project changes in favour of the resource with the highest shadow price.  
                                                     
14This effect follows from defining government consumption in the same way as in the National Accounts. 
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Table 4:  Short and long run reallocations in the case of increased payroll taxation. Percent of 
the ex ante market price of the project 
 Instantaneous Stationary 
Utility -75.6  -96.0  
   Leisure     -9.0  -19.8  
   Private (material) consumption -66.6  -76.2  
Government consumption 104.3  102.2  
Gross real investment -72.0  -8.0  
Export -2.1  -23.1  
Import -48.2  -18.5  
Current account, surplus current prices 48.0  0.0  
Total saving, current prices -18.6  0.0  
GDP -7.4  14.2  
Real capital -67.6  -253.4  
Employment, persons 98  229  
 
Since most of the increase in the payroll tax is shifted to a reduced consumer real wage rate, the 
relative factor prices do not change much. However, the reduction in the capital-labour ratio is 
stronger with payroll tax financing than with lump-sum taxation. The reason is that the reduction in 
private consumption is stronger, which reduces Dwellings and other stocks of household capital. The 
short run decline in total savings is partly offset by the increase in the net exports. In principle, the 
shift in the composition of savings from Dwellings to financial assets contributes to improve the 
aggregate efficiency of the Norwegian economy, because the effective tax rate on the returns from 
Housing capital is much lower than the effective tax rate on other types of capital income. However, 
when the effect is triggered by our marginal government project, it is hardly visible in the model 
results. The stronger initial drop in investments reinforces the dynamic changes in the wage rate and 
prices explained above. Thus, the long run crowding out effects, especially of private consumption, 
exceed the short run effects. 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that the social cost of a marginal government project may be lower than its ex ante 
market price even when we take into account the social cost of neutralizing the public budget effect 
through an increase in the effective tax rate on labour income, which is already high in Norway. Our 
CGE estimate of the social cost marginal increase in government consumption equals 88 percent of the 
ex ante market price when the project is financed by an increase in the payroll tax rate. We decompose 
the total social cost into the social resource cost of and the additional cost of public funds. We estimate 
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the ratio of the social cost to the market price to 74 percent, whereas our estimate of the MCF 
associated with pay-roll tax financing equals 1.20, i.e. 20 percent of the social resource cost. The funds 
that must be raised to finance the project amounts to 85 percent of the market price.  
 
The reason why the total social cost is lower than the ex ante market price is that the social resource 
cost is significantly lower than the market price of the resources. This ratio decreases the more labour 
intensive is the project. The reason is due to the heavy effective tax wedge distorting the leisure-
consumption trade off in the Norwegian economy, which makes the shadow price of labour 
significantly lower than the producer wage rate. The shadow price of labour is a weighted average of 
the price of leisure and the price of private consumption. The endogenous weights reflect what is 
crowded out of the two goods leisure and private consumption. Crowding out leisure means that 
employment increases from a sub-optimal level. The more leisure that is crowded out, the lower is the 
social cost of labour.  
 
Changes in relative prices will be negligible as long as the project is marginal. However, in a small 
open economy facing fixed world prices where all technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, prices 
and wages will be independent of even a large project. In this reference case the social resource cost 
will be independent of the scale of the government project, as long as the project does not change the 
relative supplies of primary factors too much, i.e. beyond the average that can be obtained by a linear 
combination of the factor intensities in the existing traded goods sectors. The technology of the firms 
in our CGE model exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Consequently, relative prices, especially the 
real wage rate, will change if the project is non-marginal. However, the simulation experiments show 
that the empirical impact on relative prices is modest. 
 
For a large increase in government consumption one effect deserves special attention. Although the 
direct and indirect import share in government consumption is substantially lower than in the private 
consumption that is crowded out, the expansion of labour supply and total demand will raise imports 
as a first round effect. This is inconsistent with the intertemporal constraint on foreign debt, so the 
general equilibrium adjustments imply an increase in exports and a reduction of import shares. The 
necessary improvement of international competitiveness is brought about by a reduction in the wage 
rate. An increase in the wage rate will raise most tax bases. It also raises the price of government 
consumption as well as most transfers since they are indexed to wages. If the public budget were 
balanced initially, the budget effect of the increase in wages would be negligible. However, the fiscal 
policy rule followed in Norway implies that the government petroleum revenue pays for a significant 
fraction of government expenditure. This revenue is close to independent of wages. Consequently, an 
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increase in the wage rate has a negative budget effect, which contributes to magnify the increase in the 
endogenous tax instrument, as well as the unit cost of public funds.  
 
Our estimate of the resource cost of a government project in Norway is lower than the CGE estimate 
in Vennemo (1991). One explanation is that Vennemo assumes that the project does not employ 
labour, but only intermediate materials. As pointed out above, labour is the dominating input in an 
average government project, and the social cost is decreasing in the input share of labour in the 
project. In addition Vennemo's cost estimate is positively affected by an endogenous loss in the terms 
of trade. This is due to his adoption of the Armington hypothesis, according to which Norwegian 
products are close but imperfect substitutes for the corresponding foreign products.15 The welfare 
effects caused by endogenous terms-of-trade changes are hard to interpret and believe when they show 
up in CGE-analyses of policy reforms, often as the dominating effect. The Armington hypothesis 
implies that Norwegian firms can exhaust monopoly rents if firms behave collusively or if the policy 
changes result in higher costs. In our computations, world prices are fixed, which is the standard 
assumption in CGE-analyses of policy changes in small open economies. Recent estimates support this 
assumption, see Naug (2001). 
 
Our MCF-estimate associated with the payroll tax of 1.20 lies within the range spanned by corre-
sponding estimates in the literature. Interestingly, a Norwegian expert committee (see NOU 1997:27), 
recommended that decentralised cost-benefit evaluations of government projects in Norway should set 
the MCF equal to 1.20. This figure was considered to be an appropriate average of the relevant esti-
mates in the MCF literature. It is lower than the estimates for Norway in Vennemo (1991). However, 
Vennemo measures MCF as the ratio of the total welfare loss and the ex ante market price of the pro-
ject, i.e. by dU wdLO i  in the terminology from Section 2. Consequently, he includes the deviation 
between shadow price and the ex ante market price in the MCF. Håkonsen and Mathiesen (1997) ar-
gue that a reasonable estimate of MCF associated with a tax on labour income in Norway lies in the 
interval 1.40 – 1.60. Their estimate is based on a stylised static one-sector model in which labour sup-
ply is more elastic with respect to the real wage rate than in our model. Madsen (2004) presents MCF 
estimates for broad tax instruments for the Danish economy based on an overlapping generations CGE 
model. His estimates of the MCF associated with broad taxes on labour income are in the vicinity of 
1.10.  
 
                                                     
15 For each tradable, export is determined by foreign demand, which is, cet. par, decreasing in the price of Norwegian exports 
in the CGE model used in Vennemo (1991). The reduction of the demand for imports caused by the project requires a an 
increase in the value of exports, which in turn warrants a reduction in the Norwegian export prices in order to restore the 
trade balance restriction. 
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A rather uncontroversial conclusion is that the parameters determining the labour supply behaviour are 
the most crucial uncertain variables underlying the estimates of the social cost government consump-
tion. The typical CGE models specify a single or a few representative agents. Rather than looking for 
new and more robust estimates of the parameters of the corresponding aggregate labour supply func-
tions, it may be more efficient to disaggregate the representation of the labour supply decisions in or-
der to better capture the estimates derived in the micro-econometric literature on labour supply. Micro-
econometric labour supply studies typically find a large degree of heterogeneity along several dimen-
sions relevant to the labour supply behaviour. Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) represents state of 
the art as far as estimates on Norwegian household data are concerned. Thus, aggregate labour supply 
elasticities are difficult to interpret and they may not be autonomous with respect to the shifts. Aa-
berge, Columbino, Holmøy, Strøm and Wennemo (2004) show that the aggregate labour supply elas-
ticities computed from the corresponding individual elasticities of about 4000 individuals are far from 
invariant to changes in real wages and non-labour income. Moreover, the representative agents typi-
cally face average marginal tax rates, rather than the actual marginal tax rates. In result, the true tax 
distortions - crucial to the social cost estimates - may be mis-specified. MCF estimates based on a 
CGE model with a much richer representation of the estimated heterogeneous labour supply behaviour 
belongs to a future research project.      
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